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THE REFORM OF GROUP LIFE INSURANCE LA W 1
REUBEN A. HASSON*
Introduction
If one were to mention the words "life insurance" to a law stu-
dent, he would almost certainly think of an agent soliciting life in-
surance from a given individual who had to undergo a medical ex-
amination before he was approved by an insurer. If our student were
next to study that part of the provincial insurance legislation which
deals with life insurance, he would be strengthened in his view that
individual life insurance was the usual kind of insurance that was
written. That part of The Insurance Act that deals with life assurance
assumes that the normal type of policy is an individual one;
references to group life insurance appear almost as footnotes tacked
on to provisions dealing with individual life insurance. Finally, if our
hypothetical student examined the case digests and a recent treatise
on Canadian life insurance law, 2 he would feel certain that individual
life insurance was more important than group life insurance. But,
despite all this "evidence," such a view would be mistaken.
The amount of group life insurance in force at the present time is
greater than the amount of individual life insurance as is shown by
the following figures:
Individual Life Group Life
Year Insurance Insurance
1976 $105,285 million $139,596 million
1977 $118,240 million $164,813 million 3
Thus, at the end of 1977, of the total life insurance in force, approx-
imately 58.2% was group life insurance.4
The figures demonstrating the development of group life in-
surance are dramatic. They are as follows for the period from 1948 to
1968:
Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
I. In this article, I am not dealing with creditor's group insurance or fraternal benefit associations. I also
do not propose to deal with group disability insurance, although this kind of insurance is very com-
monly sold together with group life insurance.
2. See D. Norwood, Life Insurance Law in Canada (1977), Approximately one-tenth of the book (33 out
of 341 pages) deals with the problems of group life insurance.
3. Figures kindly supplied to the author by Mr. M. S. Fowler, Chief, Registration and Analysis, Life In-
surance Division, Superintendent's Office, Ottawa, in a letter dated August 10, 1978. Unfortunately,
it is not known how much group life insurance is term and how much is permanent.
4. Ibid.
Individual Life Group Life
Year Insurance Insurance
1948 $ 11,293 million $ 1,814 million
1958 $ 26,092 million $ 10,404 million
1968 $ 51,610 million $ 41,602 million5
It seems likely, given these figures, that group life insurance will at
least maintain its superior position vis-d-vis individual life insurance.
Indeed, it is possible that group life insurance's share of the total
amount of insurance coverage will go on increasing, until we reach
the position where individual life insurance is an appendage to group
life insurance.
The difficulty with group life insurance at the present time is
that our policy-makers seem to treat group life insurance in the same
way as our hypothetical law student. Our present regulation of group
life insurance seems to operate on the assumption that we are dealing
with a phenomenon of marginal social importance. Since we seem to
make that assumption, an irresponsibly casual attitude dominates
our policy towards group life insurance. Thus, our principal means
of regulating unfair provisions in group life insurance is through the
use of non-binding directives issued by the provincial Superinten-
dents of Insurance. 6 These directives are totally hortatory; there is no
evidence that all insurers transacting group life insurance are even
familiar with them. If it be argued that competition provides sanc-
tions against companies acting unethically, then it is difficult to see
the need for directives at all.
Just as disturbing as the fact that the guidelines are merely hor-
tatory, is the fact that the guidelines do not deal with many of the
problems in group life insurance. Before going on to identify the
problems in group life insurance law and possible solutions for these
problems, it is necessary to describe, in outline, how group line in-
surance works.
5. See A. Pedoe, Life Insurance, Annuities and Pensions (1970) 319.
6. Thus, directives were issued in 1972: Proceedings of the Association of Insurance Superintendents
(1972) 76. New directives were issued in 1973: Proceedings of the Association of Insurance
Superintendents (1973) 167. These were in turn updated in 1974: Proceedings of the Association of In-
surance Superintendents (1974) 179. The more recent directives on group life insurance were issued in
1976 and are to be found in the Proceedings of the Association of Insurance Superintendents for that
year at 180.
Unfortunately, regulation by directive is not limited to group life insurance. In recent years, provin-
cial Superintendents have issued directives on subjects such as abuses in creditor's group insurance,
misleading life insurance policies, unfair settlement practices and subrogation abuses. Seen as a
technique for controlling insurance abuses, it can only be described as bizarre.
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The Mechanics of Group Life Insurance7
A group life insurance contract is entered into between an in-
surer and an employer (the policyholder) for the benefit of the
employees (the insureds) under the policy. It is of the essence of
group life insurance that every life entering the group is covered
without medical examination or other proof of insurability except
that of being at work. In the early days of group insurance the
minimum number of employees for a plan to be accepted without
medical examination or evidence of insurability was 100. This
number has become progressively reduced and is now as low as three,
which may include executive officers, partners, or proprietors.
If the insurance is non-contributory, i.e. the employer pays the
whole premium, 100% of the eligible employees must be included in
the group. If the employees pay part of the premium, a contributory
plan, then insurers insist that at least 75% of the eligible employees
come into the plan and that that proportion remain in it.8
Insurance is usually written on a one-year term basis but it is
possible to combine this term insurance with group permanent life in-
surance. Indeed, this combination of coverages has been developed
to such an extent that it is now impossible to say how much of group
life insurance is term insurance and how much is. permanent.
Group life insurance is said to have distinct advantages for
employers, employees and insurance companies. The employer
benefits by offering a benefit, at low cost, to his employees. From his
point of view, labour turnover is reduced since employees realize that
they lose, at least temporarily, insurance coverage if they change
jobs. The employee benefits by obtaining insurance at modest cost
without the necessity of a physical examination. Finally, for the in-
surer, group insurance is profitable because the high cost of employ-
ing intermediaries is eliminated. 9 Also, insurers'are said to benefit
from a low lapse rate.
Although group insurance is said to be a supplementary form of
insurance for employees, there are some employees for whom their
7. For fuller accounts of the workings of group life insurance, see Supra n. 5, Chap. 25, and D.W.
Gregg, Group Life Insurance (1962).
8. Contributory plans will not be used unless the employer has at least 50 eligible employees.
9. On the high costs of employing intermediaries, see the Report on Insurance Study submitted to the
Superintendent, Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations, Ontario by Douglas H. Car-
ruthers, Q.C. (now Mr. Justice Carruthers) (Toronto, 1973-75). The Report states that "Commission
rates alone in auto and property insurance range between 7% and 2517o of premiums, with more
business done at the higher end of that range"; Id., at Vol. 3, 51.
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group life insurance is their only life insurance. 10 Even when group
life insurance provides supplementary coverage, this fact does not
reduce its importance because many employees will buy less in-
dividual life insurance than they otherwise would have bought, since
they have already "bought"'" a certain amount of group life in-
surance.
Before discussing the problems of group life insurance law in
detail, it is necessary to stress that many, if not most, of the problems
arise from the fact that the policyholder (the employer) is not the
same person as the insured (employee). For one thing, when the
policyholder buys a policy for someone else, he (the policyholder) is
less likely to scrutinize the policy to see if there are unfair terms than
if he were buying the policy for himself. In a group life situation,
there is very strong pressure on the employer to consider only the
price of the policy and to ignore the question of whether the policy
provisions are fair or not.1 2 Further, it is true that very few insureds
are able to get insurers to delete obnoxious provisions from their
policies but sometimes they have been able to do so. In the group
life situation, it is impossible for the insured employees to get the
insurer to remove an obnoxious provision since the employees get no
notice of the policy provisions at all.' 3
An even more serious difficulty arises from the fact that the
policyholder is not the insured. The fact that the policyholder is not
the insured means that he (the policyholder) can by wilful or careless
acts extinguish the insured's rights without the insured being aware
that this has happened. It is instructive, in this regard, to compare the
position of an employee under a group life insurance plan with the
position of a mortgagee under a fire insurance policy. In the first
place, while an employee under a group insurance policy may have
his rights extinguished without being informed of that fact, The In-
surance Act specifically requires that an insurer give the mortgagee
10. The proportion of employees who are covered by group plans but wno would be uninsurable for in-
dividual policies has been estimated by one authority to be between 5 and 10 per cent of the total work
force; see Gregg, Supra n. 7, at 21. In addition to this number must be added an unknown number of
employees who are insurable for individual policies, but who choose to rely solely on their group in-
surance policies.
11. Just as there is no such thing as a free lunch, there is no free group life insurance even when the
employer pays the entire premium.
12. 1 am happy to concede that most purchasers of insurance consider only the price of insurance. My
only argument is that some purchasers of insurance who would normally study policy terms and the
general reputability of a company before buying insurance are tempted when buying group life in-
surance to ignore these factors and to concentrate only on a very crude measurement of price.
13. Even when theemployees get noticeof unfair provisions, they cannot bargain these away with the in-
surance company since they (the employees) did not purchase the policy. The employees would have
to persude the employer to enter into negotiations with the insurer to remove unfair provisions and
the employer may not be interested in doing this.
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notice of any purported cancellation of the policy.14 Second, while
employees may suffer because of some error or omission on the part
of the employer, the standard mortgage clause provides that the in-
terest of the mortgagee "shall not be invalidated by any act or neglect
of the mortgagor."II Neither of these protections afforded to mort-
gagees is available to employees under a group life insurance policy.
It is now necessary to examine, in some detail, the potentially
precarious situation of an employee under a group life insurance
plan.
The Legal Problems Involved in the Use of Group Life Insurance
The Problem of Unfair Terms
The first problem that arises from the use of group insurance is
one that is common to all kinds of insurance in every country where
insurance is sold. That problem is the central one of how to regulate
unfair terms in insurance contracts.16
Our insurance law deals with the problem of unfair terms in a
number of ways. In the first place, the Legislature has enacted a
number of provisions which give the insured a minimal amount of
protection. Thus, an insurer cannot avoid a policy because of the in-
sured's misrepresentation without proof that the misrepresentation
related to a material fact.17 Second, the Legislature can require, as it
does in the case of automobile insurance, that an insurer's policy has
to be approved by the Superintendent.' 8 Third, the Legislature may,
as it does in the case of fire insurance, give the judiciary power to
strike down any "exclusion, stipulation, condition or warranty..."
which is found to be "unjust or unreasonable by the court before
which a question relating thereto is tried."'19 Fourth, our courts exer-
cise some control over unfair terms by the use of the contra pro-
ferentem doctrine which allows courts, in effect, to strike out unfair
provisions in insurance contracts while purporting to construe
them. 20
14. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 121.
15. See e.g. London L&S Co. of Canada v. Union Insurance Co. of Canton Ltd., [1 9251 4 D.L.R. 676
(Ont. S.C. App. Div.).
16. Even Professor Posner concedes, by a circuitous route, that there are unfair provisions in standard
form contracts. After pointing out that competition deals adequately with the problem of the unfair
provision, Posner states: "An occasional feature of printed contracts that is objectionable is the use
of fine print to slip an onerous provision past an unwary customer"; R. Posner, Economic Analysis
ofLaw, (1977) 85. Posner would regulate these provisions by deeming them to be fradulent. Since this
technique involves the use of a fiction, I see no merit in adopting it. I shall, therefore, continue
talking about unfair provisions.
17. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 98(5).
18. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 201.
19. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 125(b).
20. For a truly remarkable use of contra proferentem in a group life insurance contract situation, see the
recent decision in Lund v. Great- West Life Assurance Co. (1976), 66 D.L.R. (3d) 143 (Sask. Q.B.).
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Of the four techniques described above, group life insurance is
affected by the first and the fourth techniques. To deal with the
legislative protection first, the Insurance Acts provide that a
misrepresentation (or a failure to disclose) of a fact by the employer
about an employee's insurability does not render the policy voidable,
unless the insurer specifically asks for evidence of insurability. 21 In
addition, there are the standard protections available in the case of
individual life insurance. 22 These statutory provisions give but
minimal protection against unfair policy provisions. The protection
that is offered by the fourth technique of control, the doctrine of
contra proferentem, is probably even less than that provided by the
skeletal legal protections offered by the Insurance Acts. For one
thing, the doctrine of contra proferentem requires that the Judge find
an ambiguity in the insurance policy and not even the most compas-
sionate Judge may be able to erect an ambiguity to defeat a clear but
unfair policy provision. Second, in common with the third technique
of control, the power given to courts to strike out unfair clauses, con-
traproferentem is a very crude device for attacking unfair policy pro-
visions. Judges who know little about the insurance industry and who
have no means of obtaining the actuarial evidence relevant for an in-
formed decision, are, rightly, going to be very cautious about the way
they exercise their power. 23 The danger then becomes that this power
is exercised so sparingly as to offer no protection. 24
The third drawback with judicial control, overt or covert, is that
even if a clause is nullified, the insurer is not prevented from continu-
ing to use an obnoxious clause or one very similar to it. The insurer
loses nothing by continuing to use the obnoxious clause and it has a
powerful weapon against an insured who does not seek legal advice
or one who consults an incompetent lawyer. Even where the insured
consults a competent lawyer, the obnoxious clause may serve the
function of buying the insurer valuable time. But for the offensive
clause, the insurer might have paid immediately. A dispute over an
21. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 158(3).
22. See e.g., the protection given by incontestability provision, The Insurance Act, Id., and the protec-
tion given by the grace provision, The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 156(2).
23. Thus, I have not been able to find a single reported case in which a court has used its power under
s. 125(b) of The Insurance Act to nullify an unreasonable or unfair provision in a fire insurance policy.
This is so, despite the fact that the provision has been in force since 1889, and the courts have been
given every opportunity to exercise their power.
24. For a more sanguine view of the ability of the courts to offer protection to the insured see R. Keeton,
"Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions" (1970), 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961, 1281. In a
later article, Professor Keeton concedes judicial protection through the doctrine of honouring
reasonable expectations produces highly unpredictable results; see "Honoring Reasonable Expecta-
tions in the Interpretation of Life and Health Insurance Contracts," 1971 Proceedings A.B.A. Sec-
tion of Insurance, Compensation and Accident Law, 213.
offensive policy provision may give the insurer say, a year's use of the
insured's money. 25
Since the legislative and judicial protections seem so limited, one
is tempted to examine the second technique of control: ad-
ministrative approval of policies as an alternative means of regula-
tion. It is clearly a better technique for policing insurance contracts
than the various judicial techniques. Unlike the courts, the ad-
ministrative authority is able to get the actuarial evidence necessary
to make an informed decision as to whether a policy provision is fair
or not. Secondly, the administrative authority, unlike the courts, is
able to see that bad insurance contracts ("products") 26 are not used
again by an insurer. The sanctions for continued use of prohibited in-
surance policies can be made severe enough to ensure compliance
with any order of the administrative agency .21
The administrative technique of control has one advantage over
the legislative technique of control. The latter technique is essentially
reactive. It operates after abuses have occurred. With administrative
controls, it is possible to prevent bad policies from being sold.
Administrative policing of insurance contracts is not unknown
in Canada; it is the principal technique used to police automobile in-
surance policies. 28 If it be argued that special administrative control is
necessary in automobile insurance to safeguard the interests of inno-
cent third parties, then we should have administrative control in
group life insurance because that form of insurance is concerned
solely with protecting innocent third parties (or their dependents).
To be sure, no known system of administrative control works
perfectly. As Kimball and Pfennigstorf have pointed out, it is dif-
ficult to counter "the significant role of industry representatives in
drafting standard policies." ' 29 But this practical limitation on con-
trolling policy terms is shared by all forms of insurance regulation.
The advantage of the administrative means of control, over the other
techniques, is that it gets public officials to question and scrutinize
25. Even in cases where the Court has awarded the payment of interest to be made by the insurer, the rate
has been sufficiently low for insurers to continue to remain unterrified; see e.g. Inn Cor Int'l. Ltd. v.
American Home Assurance Co. (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 46 (Ont. C.A.) (507o interest awarded) and
Bohl v. Great-West Life Insurance Co. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 584 (Sask. C.A.) (51/o interest
awarded).
26. For a judicial description of the insurance contract as a product, see the opinion of Mr. Justice
Tobriner for a majority of the Supreme Court of California in Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
(1962), 377 P. 2d 284 (Cal. S.C.). Professor Leff has, rightly, suggested that we should view all stan-
dard form contracts as products. A. Leff, "Contract as Thing" (1970), 19 Am. U.L. Rev. 131.
27. Thus, for persistent offenders, the revocation of the insurer's licence would be an appropriate
penalty.
28. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 201.
29. S. Kimball and W. Pfennigstorf, "Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of Insurance Con-
tracts: A Comparative Study of American and European Practise" (1964), 39 Ind. L.J. 674, at 729.
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each policy provision for fairness. As argued earlier, they are in a bet-
ter position than the courts to do this because they are able to obtain
the information to make an informed decision on the fairness of a
policy provision.
It is sometimes argued that a system of administrative control
prevents insurers from marketing new policies. It is difficult to see
any force in this argument. There is simply no evidence that insurers
in Germany or the United States, to name two countries where ad-
ministrative regulation is used,3 0 are less innovative than insurers in
the United Kingdom, where administrative regulation of policies is
unknown.3 1 It is true that a system of administrative control would
forbid the selling of bad group life insurance policies but this is no
bad thing because bad insurance policies should be treated in the
same way that we treat contaminated food32 or unsafe cars.33
Unfortunately, there is no evidence that the provincial
Superintendents of Insurance are thinking in terms of a system of ad-
ministrative control for group life policies. According to Mr. James
Darwish, Insurance Superintendent for Alberta and Chairman of the
Accident and Sickness Legislation Committee, it is proposed that
group life insurers spell out all coverage limitations "in concise, col-
loquial language that is clear, unambiguous and easily readable." 3 4
While the exhortation to insurers to write their policies in plain
English is to be welcomed, 35 disclosure of unfair terms cannot be
regarded as a technique of control. Pointing out unfair terms in an
insurance policy is the equivalent of selling a defective product
without giving the disappointed purchaser any right to reject the
defective product. Since we do not tolerate this state of affairs when
30. See S. Kimball and W. Pfennigstorf, "Administrative Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts:
A Comparative Study", (1965), 40 Ind. L.J. 143.
31. See the statement of Professor Gower that "there can be few countries . . . where the insurance com-
panies are allowed the same freedom to dictate their own terms." See his chapter, "Business" M.
Ginsberg (ed.), Law and Opinion in England in the 20th Cenury (1957) 143, at 163. Although Pro-
fessor Gower wrote this more than twenty years ago, it is still a correct description of present day
English law.
32. See The Food and Drug Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27.
33. See Motor Vehicle Safety Act, R.S.C. 1970 (1st. Supp.), c. 26.
34. Report of meeting of the Provincial Superintendents of Insurance, The Globe& Mail, May7, 1977, at
BI.
35. Complaints relating to the incomprehensibility of insurance policies go back to the days of Lord
Mansfield. Thus, in Simondv. Boydell(1779), I Doug. 268; 99 E.R. 175 (K.B.), he said: "It is amaz-
ing when additional clauses are introduced, that the merchants do not take some advice in framing
them or bestow more consideration upon themselves. I do not recollect an addition made which has
not created doubts on the construction of it." Id., at 271; 99 E.R., at 177. Nearly two centuries later,
the Select Committee on Company Law said the following about the standard automobile policy:
"Despite the fact that all the Committee members had had some experience in studying formal
documents of a statutory nature, they nevertheless found the terms of the policy to be obscure in the
extreme." Select Committee on Company Law, Report on the Insurance Industry - First Report on
Automobile Insurance (1977) 39.
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we are dealing with the sale of goods,3 6 it is difficult to see why we
should embrace it when the good that is being sold is called "in-
surance." One could only justify such a state of affairs if one
thought that "insurance" was a less valuable good than ordinary
goods. But such a theory is clearly untenable because we recognize in
our public policy that insurance is a more valuable good than or-
dinary articles of commerce. It is on this basis that we require in-
surance companies to have minimum capital requirements, 37 and it is
on this basis that we regulate their investment decisions.38 Such ex-
traordinary regulation, which we do not require of ordinary commer-
cial enterprises, shows that we regard insurance as an exceptionally
important purchase.39
It is proposed to examine two clauses in group life insurance
policies which, it is submitted, would not stand up to critical scrutiny
if a fairness test were to be adopted.
The "Actively-at-Work" Requirement
Although direct evidence of individual insurability is not re-
quired for the purpose of establishing a group plan, insurers usually
rely on indirect evidence of insurability by requiring that each in-
dividual be actively at work when the group policy is issued. The
employee must also be actively at work when subsequent increases
are made in the amount of his insurance.
The purpose of this requirement is said to be to prevent
employers, particularly smaller employers, from obtaining "death-
bed" coverage for one or more employees. 0 It may be conceded that
in a family business, there is some danger that an employer will in-
clude an unemployable member of his family among those insured
but the insurer can protect itself by asking for evidence of insurability
in that case.4 1 To have protection of this kind against the risk of
employers employing strangers so as to obtain "death-bed coverage"
for the dependents of these strangers seems to be unnecessary and
cruel. All the evidence we have suggests that employers discriminate,
often irrationally, against those employees who are seen to be dis-
36. E.g., The Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 421, s. 15 and The Consumer Protection Act, S.O.
1971, Vol. 2 (Supp. to R.S.O. 1970), c. 24, s. 44(a).
37. See, principally, the Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-15 and he
Foreign Insurance Companies Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-16.
38. Ibid.
39. See J. Hellner, "The Scope of Insurance Regulation: What is Insurance for Purposes of
Regulation?" (1963), 12 Am. J. Comp. Law 494. Professor Hellnerargues forcefullyand, in my view,
correctly, that the social importance of a promise should be a very important factor in deciding
whether an enterprise is to be treated as being engaged in the business of insurance.
40. See e.g., Gregg, Supra n. 7, at 35-36.
41. The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 158(3).
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abled or sick. 42 Indeed, employers in Canada are given a subsidy
through the operation of the Second Injury Fund, 43 to encourage
them to employ disabled workers.
The arbitrary and unjust results that may occur as a result of the
"actively-at-work" requirement can easily be illustrated by consider-
ing a number of hypothetical cases:
4 4
(i) An employer with 400 employees 4 takes out a one-year
group term policy for his employees commencing on January 2,
1978. On that date, five employees are not working. One of the
employees is not working because he is ill and four of the employees
are on vacation. On January 5, 1978, the employee who is ill at home
is killed in a household accident and the other four employees are
killed in an automobile accident. None of the dependents of these
employees would be entitled to recover, since none of these
employees were "actively-at-work" when the policy was issued.
(ii) An employer with 300 employees took out a one-year group
term policy for his employees commencing on January 2, 1968. Every
year the policy was renewed and on January 2, 1978, the benefits
under the policy were increased. On January 2, 1978, X who had
been employed since the policy was first taken out is not at work
because of illness. On January 5, 1978, X dies as a result of illness.
X's dependents would not be entitled to recover because most group
life policies require that employees be "actively-at-work" when the
amount of coverage for them is increased.
(iii) An employer with 300 employees took out a one-year group
term policy with the Good Faith Insurance Company on January 2,
1948. Every year the policy was renewed until January 2, 1978. On
that date, the employer changed insurers and effected a one-year
group term policy with the Reliable Insurance Company. On January
2, 1978, Y, an employee who had been covered by the group policy
since its inception in 1948, was not at work because of illness. On
January 5, 1978, Y died as a result of illness. Y's dependents would
not be able to recover since Y was not "actively-at-work" when the
42. For a discussion of discrimination in England against disabled workers, see F. Field, Unfair Shares:
The Disabled and Unemployment, Low Pay Unit Paper No. 20, (1977).
43. Briefly put, the Second Injury Funds operated by the various provincial Workmen's Compensation
Boards seek to encourage employers to employ disabled workers by not charging the full costs of
compensating the disabled worker in a subsequent accident to the employer. The efficacy of these
funds in achieving their stated purpose is open to very serious doubt.
44. 1 have been able to find only one reported case on the interpretation of the "actively-at-work" re-
quirement: Kriluck v. Imperial Life Assurance (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 196 (Ont. H.C.). We know,
however, from other problems in insurance law, notably the insurer's power to terminate coverage,
that the absence of reported litigation does not mean that a particular provision is not giving rise to
difficulties.
45. 1 have chosen numbers lower than 500 because insurers generally waive the "actively-at-work" re-
quirement in enterprises with more than 500 employees.
new policy took effect. (Y's dependents would have been able to
recover if his employer had maintained his insurance with the Good
Faith Insurance Company since Y was actively-at-work when the
policy was first taken out).
There is no need to give further examples of employees who are
deemed to be ineligible for coverage because of the actively-at-work
requirement. Suffice it to say, that in addition to the hypothetical
situations canvassed, employees who are laid-off, locked-out, or who
are on strike, all run the risk of running afoul of the actively-at-work
requirement. What is ironic about the actively-at-work requirement
is that many of the employees who are caught by it, are employees
who were insurable as good risks. It is, indeed strange, when a form
of insurance that is supposed to be more tolerant of the poor risk,
turns out to be more demanding in its qualifications for eligibility
than a form of insurance which is supposed to impose more stringent
criteria for acceptability.
In short, it is suggested that the actively-at-work requirement
should be removed. A model statute should state that the only condi-
tion the employee needs to satisfy is that there is bona fide employ-
ment relationship. It should, further, be provided that if an employee
is unable to work because of disability, or because of leave of
absence, temporary lay-off, lock-out, or a strike, that the employ-
ment relationship should not be considered terminated, unless the
employer chooses expressly to do so.
The Probationary Work Period
A clause which performs the same function as the "actively-at-
work" provision is the requirement present in nearly all group
policies that the employee serve a probationary period of employ-
ment before coverage becomes effective. The probationary work
period differs from the "actively-at-work" requirement in that the
former period runs for a stipulated period of time, from say, 30 to 90
days whereas the "actively-at-work" is of indefinite duration.
The difficulty with the probationary work period requirement is
that, if it is made a very short period, say 30 days, there is no ac-
tuarial evidence that employees who die in the first month of work
are likely to be poorer risks than those who do not die within this
period. A 30-day period may be too short a time in which to separate
out the good risks from the uninsurables. If, however, we insist on
say, a 90-day probationary requirement in order to reduce the
lottery-like character of a probationary period that is too short, then
we are depriving employees of their coverage in a one-year group
term policy for one quarter of the period of their coverage.
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Another problem with the probationary work requirement is
that it gives no security to an employee who changes jobs. Thus, an
employee who began work in 1948 and who is now working for say,
his seventh employer may run afoul of the probationary period,
after having survived probationary periods for his six previous
employers. For the vast number of employees who change their jobs,
probationary periods mean that these employees have, in effect, to
prove that they are insurable on several different occasions. This
state of affairs means that an-employee is deprived of the security
that life insurance is intended to provide.
As I have argued above,4 6 there is not a shred of evidence that
employers collude with their employees to obtain the latter "death-
bed" coverage. Indeed, the evidence indicates that employers are
cautious to a fault in their hiring policies.4 7 Insurers seek to reinforce
this caution on the part of employers by a system of experience rating
which gives dividends to employers with favourable claims ex-
perience. 48 Finally, insurers are able to cancel a group policy when
they suspect a collusive hiring by an employer, and they may ask for
evidence of insurability 49 in situations where they (the insurers) fear
that employers are not being selective enough in their hiring policies.
In the light of all these protections available to the insurer, it is sug-
gested that the probationary work requirement should be abolished.
The Right of the Employer and the Insurer to Terminate the Policy
In an individual life insurance policy, the insured does not have
to worry about the threat of cancellation. It is true that the insurer
may avoid the insured's policy because of misrepresentation or non-
disclosure on the insured's part 0 but even this right becomes at-
tenuated after two years because of the incontestability clause which
requires the insurer to prove fraud on the part of the insured.5' By
way of contrast, a group life policy may be terminated either by the
employer or the insurer. Such terminations may occur without the in-
dividual employee being aware of the fact of termination.
The Insurer's Right to Terminate the Policy
It is true that many insurers are unlikely to wish to terminate
group life insurance. However, the possibility exists and the insurer
may cancel, for example, because it feels that the employer has
46. Text, Supra n. 42-43.
47. See Supra n. 42.
48. In addition to the employer's claims experience, the other factor that will be relevant in determining
whether an employer gets a dividend is the length of time the policy has been in force.
49. See Supra n. 41.
50. See The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 157(2).
51. See The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 158(2).
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dishonestly procured insurance for an employee or else, because the
employer suffers catastrophic losses. The guidelines issued by the
provincial Superintendents of Insurance in 1976 exhort insurers not
to cancel policies except for non-payment of premiums, 2 but this
guideline is not binding on insurers.
As regards non-payment of premiums, it is suggested that the in-
surer should be able to avoid the policy if the employer is more than
twelve months in arrears with the payment of his premiums. It is ap-
preciated that this is a very long grace period,13 but unless a long
grace period is allowed, the dislocation suffered by hundreds,
perhaps thousands, of employees would be very great.
Insurers should also be able to avoid the policy if they can prove
that the employer has been making fraudulent misrepresentations, or
has otherwise been misusing the group insurance device. Unless the
employer has been guilty of some form of misconduct, it is difficult
to see why the insurer should not be under an obligation to renew the
policies at reasonable rates. This is the insurer's obligation in in-
dividual life insurance. It is impossible to see why the insured under a
group life policy should enjoy less protection than he would have had
if he had taken out an individual life policy.
The Employer's Right to Terminate the Policy
Just as it is unlikely that many insurers will want to cancel group
life insurance policies, so very few employers will want to deprive
themselves of the benefits that they (the employers) derive from the
group insurance device. Still, it is possible to think of situations
where an employer may cancel a group insurance policy either as a
cost-saving measure or as a punitive measure against some perceived
employee misconduct.
There is a remarkable U.S. decision which gives the employee
protection against cancellation of the group policy by the employer
but it is extremely unlikely that similar protection would be afforded
to employees in Canada. In Hinkler v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society,s4 the employee died after the employer had cancelled the
policy but within the grace period. The Court held that the
employee's beneficiary (his wife) was entitled to recover since as a
beneficiary under an insurance policy, she had a vested interest in the
policy, which though defeasible by lapse, could not be destroyed by
cancellation. It is difficult to see how a Canadian court could reach
52. See Rule 1(3)(c) of the Rules governing Group Life Insurance, Proceedings of the Association of In-
surance Superintendents (1976) 180.
53. Compare the usual grace period of 30 days, The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 156(2).
54. (1938), 22 N.E. 2d 451 (Ohio C.A.); see also a note on the case, "Cancellation of Group Insurance by
Employer Without Consent of Employee (1940), 49 Yale L.J. 585.
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the same result. The language of vested rights which cannot be
destroyed without the employee being notified of that fact does not
seem to have even a remote parallel in Canadian jurisprudence.
An employee whose group insurance policy has been terminated
by the employer may have a remedy against his employer but even
this is somewhat problematic. For example, if the employer agrees to
pay premiums under a collective agreement and he cancels the policy,
it is not clear what rights the dependents of an employee who died
after the policy had been cancelled, would have against the employer.
It would appear to be the case that only the union could sue in such a
case and the union has not suffered any financial loss. It is true that
the employer might be found to have committed an unfair labour
practice and it might be possible for the Labour Board or an ar-
bitrator to make some order seeking to reinstate the group policy"3 or
to award damages to an individual employee's dependents, but this
kind of relief might be slow and uncertain.16
In a situation where there is no collective agreement, an
employee's dependents might find similar difficulties in recovering
against the employer for breach of contract. For one thing, the con-
tract between the employer and the employee may expressly give the
employer the right to terminate the policy at any time. If an employer
does cancel the policy without notifying the employee, the right of
the employee's dependents are highly problematic. The employee's
dependents might try to argue that the Hedley Byrne 7 principle ex-
tended to situations where the employer failed to communicate infor-
mation which he should have done as a prudent employer but it is
very doubtful if, fiduciary obligations to one side, 8 the courts will
impose liabilities for negligent withholding of information. 9
In short, it is suggested that the employer should not be able to
cancel a group insurance policy. Similarly, an employer should be
under an obligation to renew and maintain policies, unless a majority
of employees vote to terminate their policies. Employees in this situa-
tion may be persuaded by the employer that he (the employer) can
55. Even if the labour arbitrator (or Board) made an order seeking to compel the employer to reinstate the
group policy, the insurer might refuse to do so.
56. For a discussion of the uncertain scope of the labour arbitrator's remedial authority, see P. Weiler,
"The Remedial Authority of the Labour Arbitrator: Revised Judicial Version" (1974), 52 Can. Bar
Rev. 29.
57. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [19641 A.C. 465 (H.L.).
58. See Bank of British Columbia v. Wren Developments Ltd. (1974), 38 D.L.R. (3d) 759 (B.C.S.C.).
59. Bango v. Holt (1971), 21 D.L.R. (3d) 66 (B.C.S.C.) imposed a tortious duty on a real estate agent to
disclose relevant information to a prospective purchaser but there was also a finding of fraud in that
case. For a more traditional statement of the law refusing to impose a tortious duty to disclose
material information see Argy Trading Development Co. v. Lapid Developments Ltd., [19771 1
W.L.R. 444; 119771 3 All E.R. 785 (Q.B.).
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find a cheaper group insurer or the employees may be persuaded to
accept higher wages in place of group life insurance. In the second
situation postulated above, it would be necessary to expressly
safeguard the right of the employees to convert their policies. 60
The Consequence of the Employer's Failure to Pay Premiums
Punctually
If an employer fails to pay premiums when due, and does not
pay them within the 30-day grace period allowed by the provincial In-
surance Acts, 61 then employees under a group life policy are left un-
covered, whether they know of this fact or not. This proposition is il-
lustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Northern Life
Assurance Co. v. Reierson.6 2 In Reierson, the employer sent a cheque
to the insurer in payment of a premium under the policy. The cheque
was returned by the drawer's bank because of insufficient funds. The
insurer thereupon requested a replacement cheque, retaining the
cheque returned by the bank. Shortly after the expiry of the period of
grace, one of the employees covered by the policy died and a few days
later a cheque was sent to the insurer to replace that returned by the
bank. Not surprisingly, the Alberta Court of Appeal (reversing a per-
functory trial court opinion), held that the beneficiary was entitled to
succeed on the ground that the insurer by its conduct in retaining the
returned cheque and requesting a replacement had elected to treat the
policy as still in force, thereby waiving its right to treat the policy as
lapsed. 63 The Alberta Court of Appeal's decision contains a full
analysis and discussion of authorities both in the law of insurance
and in contract law generally.
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed the decision in an un-
characteristically tired and careless opinion written by Mr. Justice
Dickson for a five-man Court. According to Mr. Justice Dickson, the
insurer's conduct in asking for a replacement cheque was not express
or unequivocal enough to amount to a waiver. It is difficult to know
in what way the insurer's conduct could have been less equivocal. It is
true that the insurer could have said, "We hereby waive the breach"
but no one, not even a lawyer, uses that kind of language. It is clear
that the insurer was going to cash the replacement cheque, rather
than say, use it as something to be framed.
Shocking though the decision in Reierson is, it is important to
point out that it would still be a frightening decision even if the in-
60. 1 deal with this problem under The Employee's Right to Convert his Policy, infra.
61. E.g., The Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 224, s. 156(2).
62. [19771 1 S.C.R. 390, (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 193 (hereinafter referred to as Reierson).
63. Reierson v. Northern Life Assurance Co. (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 276 (Alta. S.C. App. Div.).
NO. 2, 1979
surer had not waived the breach. It is just as wrong to penalize
employees for the negligence of their employer, as it is to penalize the
mortgagee for the carelessness of the mortgagor. It is bizarre that we
regard the first situation with equanimity whereas we view the second
one as intolerable.6
4
There is abundant authority from the United States taking the
position that in an action by an employee under a group policy, the
failure of the employer to pay the premium could not be raised as a
defence so as to defeat the employee's claim.6 1 It is true that the cases
from the United States were cases where the employee had made a
contribution, but the employer had failed to transmit the premiums.
This cannot, however, be treated as a significant difference from the
situation in Reierson where the employer was liable for the entire
premium.
Since we derived the whole notion of group life insurance from
the United States, it is remarkable and disturbing that these cases
were not cited to the Supreme Court in Reierson.66
It might be argued that in a case where an employee's
dependents have suffered as a result of the employer's failure to pay
the premium, the dependents should have a right against the
employer, rather than the insurer. Such a view would lead to unfor-
tunate results in many cases. As I have argued above, an employee
may not be able to prove that he has a contract with his employer or,
even if he can prove a breach, he may not be able to prove loss. 67 Fur-
ther, it should be noted that the employee has no means of knowing
whether the premium was in fact, paid or not. Since the employer
and the insurer are the parties who have the knowledge as to whether
the premium was paid or not, it is suggested that an employee's
dependents should be able to claim from the insurer. The insurer
should then be left with its claim for unpaid premiums from the
employer.
64. See Supra n. 15.
65. See e.g. All States Life Insurance Co. v. Tillnan (1933), 146 So. 393 (Ala. S.C.); Missouri State Life
Insurance Co. v. Compton (1934), 73 S.W. 2d 1079 (Tex. C.A.); Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Coker
(1933), 61 S.W. 2d 447 (Ark. S.C.). But see Newman v. Home Life Insurance Co. (1961), 255
N.C.722, 122 S.E. 2d 701 (S.C.).
66. Chief Justice Laskin has said, extra-judicially, "There is no question today about the readiness of
Canadian courts to consider American decisions, especially in areas of the law like insurance where
American experience has been deep..."; "American Legal Influences in Canada," Address to the
Law Society of the College of Law of the Arizona State University (April 1, 1975) quoted in M. Her-
man, "Law Clerking at the Supreme Court of Canada" (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 279, at 284. For
two recent examples of Supreme Court decisions where U.S. decisions seem to have been of decisive
importance see, Leepo Machine Products Ltd. v. The Western Assurance Co., [19731 S.C.R. 171,
(1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 224; and Common wealth Construction Co. Ltd. v. Imperial Oil Ltd., [197811
S.C.R. 317, (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 558.
67. See text, Supra n. 55, and 57-59.
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It is suggested, therefore, that legislation should immediately be
passed, stating that the employer's failure to pay a premium under a
group life insurance policy should not constitute a valid defence to an
employee's claim. As I have argued in the previous section, an in-
surer should be able to terminate a group policy if the employer is
more than twelve months in arrears with the payment of his (the
employer's) premiums but in such a situation, the insurer and the
employer should be required to advise employees that coverage is ter-
minating, so that the employees can exercise their right to convert
their policies. It is suggested that failure on the part of the insurer
and the employer to notify employees of the termination of coverage,
should render both liable to the employee's dependents for the face
amount of the policy.
Employer Errors in Administering the Policy
Sometimes, an insurer will resist liability because of some ad-
ministrative error on the employer's right. Thus, in some cases, an in-
surer has resisted a claim because an employer failed to add the
employee's name to the list of those persons employed by the
employer. 68
One possible means of giving relief to the employee's dependents
is indicated by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Leepo
Machine Products Ltd. v. Western Assurance Co., 69 but there are
difficulties with that decision as will be indicated. The plaintiff had
taken out an "all perils" subscription policy which covered his inven-
tory property. The policy provided for an annual premium change
which varied with the inventory stock holdings of the company over
the year. The insured was required to file monthly inventory reports
with the insurer, the purpose of the reports being initially to deter-
mine the annual premium.
Prior to the fire, a report had been sent to the insurer noting in-
ventory holdings valued at $40,000 in one of three locations covered
by the policy. After the fire it was alleged by the insured that a typing
error had been made when the report was typed by the secretary, and
that the proper inventory holding at the time was $140,000. The in-
surer was notified of this error some four days to two weeks after the
fire.
68. See e.g., Magee v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (1932), 244 N.W. 518 (N.D.S.C.); Gilford v.
Emergency Aid Insurance Co. (1949), 40 So. 2d 868 (Ala. S.C.).
69. [1973] S.C.R. 171; (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 224 (hereinafter referred to as Leepo). For an excellent
discussion of this case and the problem of rectification in insurance law, see Woodcock, "Rectifica-
tion in Insurance Law: A Lost Remedy or a Legal Chameleon?" (1977), 3 Queen's L.J. 151.
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Mrs. Justice Osler allowed the plaintiff to rectify the value
reporting clause and gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff com-
pany. The Supreme Court of Canada, reversing the Ontario Court of
Appeal, held by a majority of 3-2 that the plaintiff company was en-
titled to recover. However, the majority, speaking through Mr.
Justice Laskin (as he then was), expressly rejected recovery on the
ground of rectification.
Mr. Justice Laskin makes a contrast between the present situa-
tion and the position in marine insurance where rectification is readi-
ly granted. In his Lordship's words:
It follows that no such practice can be admitted here as prevails in marine in-
surance under which post-loss correction of values . . . may be made if there is
proof of a bona fide error: see Marine Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1970, C.260,
s.30(3). The Court of Appeal was unanimous on this point, and I agree with it. 70
The basis on which the majority granted recovery is contained in the
following passage:
[P]roof of the clerical error and of the circumstances attending it places this case
on the same footing as a case where the insurers are aware of or do not dispute
the clerical error. For them, in such a state of the facts, to seek to rely on a literal
application of cl. 10 would be to deny the good faith which underlies their
insurance obligation. 71
The fact that the employee's dependents would have to prove that
the insurer was aware of the employer's error or some other extraor-
dinary fact so as to trigger the insurer's obligation to act in good
faith, makes Leepo a dangerous precedent to rely on in the field of
group insurance. The second problem with the Leepo case is that a
court may take the view that the principles in Leepo apply only to
value-reporting policies.
A more promising basis for protecting an employee's
dependents is to be found in the decision of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal in Bohl v. Great- West Life Assurance Co. 72 In Bohl, the
insurer resisted payment to the employee's dependents on the ground
that the employee had been wrongly described by the employer as a
full-time employee. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the
employee's dependents were entitled to recover because the employee
was, in fact, a full-time employee within the meaning of the policy.
More significantly, for our present purposes, the Court held that
even if the employer had mis-classified the employee, the insurer was
70. Id., at 171; 31 D.L.R., at 233.
71. Id., at 188; 31 D.L.R., at 236.
72. (1973), 40 D.L.R. (3d) 584 (Sask. C.A.) (hereinafter referred to as Bohl).
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bound by the employer's error since the employer was acting as the
agent of the insurer in determining eligibility under the policy. The
Bohl Court followed, on this point, the decision in Elfstrom v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 73 decided by the Supreme Court of California. In
Elfstrom, the Court stated that:
The most persuasive rationale for adopting the view that the employer acts as the
agent of the insurer, however, is that the employee has no knowledge of or con-
trol over the employer's actions in handling the policy or its administration. 
74
As in the case of a dispute over the payment of premiums, the
evidence in a dispute over an administrative error is in the possession
of the employer and the insurance company. It is both unnecessary
and unfair to the employee to involve him in this dispute, unless the
employee has fraudulently colluded with the employer as a means of
obtaining insurance. 71 If it be argued that the Bohl-Elfstrom rule is
unfair to insurers, it should be pointed out that insurers can protect
themselves against employer errors by entering into indemnity
agreements with employers whereby employers are made to indem-
nify insurers for errors made by the employer in administering the
policy.
The only weakness with the Bohl decision is that it does not have
any statutory underpinning. It would, therefore, be open to other
provincial Courts of Appeal, to say nothing of the Supreme Court of
Canada, to refuse to follow the principle in the Bohl case. It is sug-
gested that the Bohl principle should be translated into statutory
form as soon as possible.
The Employee's Right to Convert his Policy
If the insurance on a person covered under a group policy ceases
because of termination of employment or termination of member-
ship in the class or classes eligible for coverage under the policy, such
a person will usually be entitled to have issued to him by the insurer,
without evidence of insurability, an individual policy of life in-
surance. This right on the part of an employee to an individual policy
is called the right of conversion. In some circumstances, the right of
conversion will be useless to an employee because he has lost his job
and he cannot afford the premiums. In other situations, the
employee will not wish to convert because he is moving into employ-
ment where the benefits are at least as adequate as they were in his
73. (1967), 432 P. 2d. 731 (Cal. S.C.) (hereinafter referred to as Elfstrom). For discussions of the decision
see e.g. "Group Insurance Policies: The Employer/Insurer Agency Relationship," [1968] Duke L.J.
824 and "Group Insurance: Agency Characterization of the Master Policy-Holder" (1971), 46 Wash.
L. Rev. 377.
74. Id., at 738.
75. There was some evidence of fraudulent collusion between employer and employee in Elfstrom and the
Supreme Court of California remanded the case so a finding could be made on this point.
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previous employment. According to a guideline adopted by the pro-
vincial Superintendents in 1977, and made applicable to group life
contracts issued or renewed after July 1, 1977, an employee will have
the right to convert his policy to $5000 or 25% of the amount in ef-
fect at the termination date, whichever is the greater. 76 These limits
will come as a great shock to many employees, most of whom would
have assumed that they could convert their policies for the full
amount.
This option to convert for the whole amount should at least be
open to those employees who can furnish evidence of insurability.
For other employees, who may be doubtful about their insurability,
conversion should be allowed at say, 75076 of the amount in effect.
The fear that employees will change jobs frequently so as to avail
themselves of conversion rights, is utterly fanciful. The insurable
employee gains nothing by moving from job to job because he can
already buy life insurance at normal rates. The employee who is
doubtful about his insurability is unlikely to change jobs in order to
obtain conversion privileges, since such an employee will lose
valuable rights, e.g. loss of seniority and pension rights.
But it is not only the fact that the right to convert is drastically
restricted 'which is disturbing. Probably even more disturbing is the
fact that an insurer need not as a matter of law, provide for any right
of conversion at all. Such a state of affairs might have been
understandable 50 years ago when group life insurance was in its in-
fancy. Today, such a state of affairs borders on the incredible.
Conclusion
To some people, many if not all of the changes proposed above
will seem to be far-reaching and impractical. One can readily under-
stand such a view at a time when insurance law reform has come to a
virtual standstill.7 7 The reality, however, is quite different. The pro-
posals made in this paper are very modest.
In some cases I have suggested, as with the Bohl principle, 7 that
we codify existing doctrine. In other situations, as with the
employer's failure to pay the premium being a defence to an
employee's dependents' claim under the policy, I have suggested that
we follow United States doctrine.7 9 Finally, I have suggested that
76. The Globe & Mail, May 7, 1977, at B5, col. I.
77. Anyone who doubts the validity of this proposition should compare our present day insurance legisla-
tion with our insurance legislation as at say, 1910.
78. See text, Supra n. 72-75.
79. See Supra n. 66.
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atavistic doctrines such as the "actively-at-work" requirement8" and
the probationary work requirement 8' should be given their quietus.
When it is realized that our real need is a comprehensive accident
and sickness scheme, 82 reforms of the kind I have suggested amount
to little more than modest reforms. The fact that the reforms I have
suggested will be seen by many as expensive, revolutionary and im-
practical, is, indeed, a cause for great sadness.
80. See text, Supra n. 40-45.
81. See text, Supra n. 46-49.
82. See T.G. Ison, The Forensic Lottery (1967); P. Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law
(1975); H. Glasbeek and R. Hasson, "Fault - The Great Hoax" in L. Klar (ed.), Studies in Canadian
Tort Law (1977) 395.
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